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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BARRY, District Judge 
 
In recognition of the fact that discrimination against the 
physically and mentally disabled was a "serious and 
pervasive social problem," Congress, in 1990, enacted the 
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA" or "Act") in order to 
level the playing field for disabled individuals in the 
workplace. Toward this end, Congress extended the 
provisions of the ADA not only to those who are actually 
disabled, but also to individuals wrongly regarded as being 
disabled. Unfortunately, however, the extent to which 
individuals who are merely "regarded as" disabled are 
entitled to be treated as though they are actually disabled 
was left far from clear. We decide today an important issue 
of first impression in this circuit -- where, as here, an 
individual is "regarded as" being disabled but is not, in fact, 
disabled, the ADA does not entitle that individual to 
accommodation in the workplace. 
 






Appellant Stacy L. Deane, a former employee of appellee 
Pocono Medical Center ("PMC"), filed a complaint which 
alleged that PMC terminated her employment in violation of 
the ADA, 42 U.S.C. SS 12101 et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973, 29 U.S.C. SS 701 et seq.; and the Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
SS 951 et seq.1 The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of PMC, and Deane has appealed. For the 




In April 1990, PMC hired Deane as a registered nurse to 
work primarily on the medical/surgical floor of the medical 
center. On June 22, 1991, while all the nurses on the 
medical/surgical floor, with the exception of Deane and one 
other nurse, were at lunch, Deane responded to an 
emergency situation in a patient's room. Upon entering the 
room, Deane discovered an elderly male patient who had 
somehow removed all but one of his restraints and was 
hanging off his bed between the side rails. Because the 
patient was in danger of falling farther and pulling the 
intravenous line out of his neck, Deane lifted him back into 
his bed. As she was about to replace the last restraint, the 
patient grabbed her right wrist, twisting it counterclockwise 
and causing the injury which culminated in this case. That 
injury -- a sprained right wrist and cartilage tear in the 
wrist -- caused her to miss approximately a year of work. 
 
In June 1992, Deane and Barbara Manges, a nurse 
assigned to Deane's workers' compensation case, 
telephoned PMC and advised Charlene McCool, PMC's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Although we will address only Deane's ADA claim, the only claim 
raised on appeal, our analysis applies equally to Deane's Rehabilitation 
Act and PHRA claims. See Kelly v. Drexel University, 94 F.3d 102, 105 
(3d Cir. 1996) (holding that the district court properly treated the 
plaintiff's PHRA claims as coextensive with his ADA claim); McDonald v. 
Dep't of Public Welfare, 62 F.3d 92, 94 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that, 
whether an action is brought under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, 
the substantive standards are the same). Neither party disputes this on 
appeal. 
 




Benefits Coordinator, of Deane's intent to return to work 
with certain restrictions. According to Deane, she informed 
McCool that she was unable to lift more than 15-20 pounds 
or perform repetitive manual tasks, such as typing, but 
that her physician, Dr. Osterman, had released her to 
return to "light duty" work.2 Deane further explained to 
McCool that, if she could not be accommodated in a light 
duty position on the medical/surgical floor, she was willing 
to move to another area of the hospital, as long as she 
could remain in nursing.3 
 
After speaking with Deane and Manges, McCool advised 
Barbara Hann, PMC's Vice President of Human Resources, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In a letter dated June 8, 1992, the contents of which were 
communicated by Deane and Manges to McCool during their telephone 
conversation, Dr. Osterman opined as follows: 
 
       I do not think [Deane] can return to unrestricted nursing i.e. I 
would 
       place a lifting limit of 20 pounds and a limit on unrestricted 
       repetitive motion of her wrist. She does believe that she can 
return 
       to some nursing and I would agree with this. She has suggested 
       pediatric nursing, neonatal nursing and possibly even the cancer 
       unit at the hospital which apparently does not involve lifting the 
       patients. All would be acceptable. 
 
Another of Deane's physicians, Dr. Sipowicz, evaluated Deane 
approximately one week after Dr. Osterman's examination. His notes 
from June 16, 1992 reveal the following conclusions: 
        It is my professional opinion that Ms. Deane is permanently 
       disabled from heavy activity and that she not have a position 
       requiring lifting greater than 20 pounds, or that on a rare- or 
       occasional basis, or any repetitive lifting using her right upper 
       extremity. Ms. Deane is seeking employment in a neo-natal and/or 
       oncology unit. This is quite all right with us. She is a registered 
       nurse. She certainly is employable. If those positions become 
       available, I feel that she should, indeed, take them. But regular 
floor 
       nursing is, in my professional opinion, out of the question now and 
       in the future. I feel that she is permanently disabled. 
 
3. This telephone call was PMC's only interaction with Deane during 
which it could have assessed the severity of or possible accommodation 
for her injuries. PMC never requested additional information from Deane 
or her physicians. According to Deane, however, she subsequently 
attempted to contact PMC on several occasions and, at least once, was 
treated rudely by McCool and told not to call again. 
 




of Deane's request to return to work, her attendant work 
restrictions, and her stated need for accommodation. 
Shortly after considering the information conveyed by 
McCool and after comparing it to the job description of a 
medical/surgical nurse at PMC, Hann determined that 
Deane was unable to return to her previous position. Hann 
then asked Carol Clarke, PMC's Vice President of Nursing, 
and Susan Stine, PMC's Director of Nursing 
Resources/Patient Care Services, to review Deane's request 
to return to PMC and explore possible accommodations for 
her. Both Clarke and Stine concluded that Deane could not 
be accommodated in her previous job as a nurse on the 
medical/surgical floor or in any other available position at 
the hospital. Finally, Hann asked Marie Werkheiser, PMC's 
Nurse Recruiter, whether there were any current or 
prospective job openings for registered nurses at PMC. 
According to Werkheiser, there were no such openings at 
that time. 
 
As a result of the collective determination that Deane 
could not be accommodated in her previous job or in any 
other available position in the hospital, PMC sent Deane an 
"exit interview" form on August 7, 1992. On August 10, 
1992, Hann notified Deane by telephone that she could not 
return to work because of her "handicap," and this 
litigation ensued.4 
 
Deane argued before the district court that she was both 
actually disabled as a result of her injury and that she was 
perceived to be so by PMC. On summary judgment, the 
court rejected both theories and held that Deane was 
neither disabled nor regarded by her employer as being 
disabled and that, even if she were, she failed to meet the 
statutory definition of a qualified individual with a 
disability. Deane has not appealed the district court's 
determination that she was not actually disabled. Indeed, 
she now concedes that "[i]n light of the decisional trends in 
this Circuit and others," she is not now and never was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In March 1993, Deane accepted a registered nurse position at a non- 
acute care facility, where she remained until May 1993. Deane has been 
employed by a different non-acute care facility since July 1993. These 
positions do not require heavy lifting, bathing patients, or the like. 
 




disabled and, consequently, that, but for PMC's erroneous 
perception of her actual impairment, she would have no 
claim under the ADA. 
 
What is left for us, then, are Deane's contentions that 
she was disabled under the terms of the ADA by virtue of 
the fact that PMC regarded her limitations as being far 
worse than they actually were, that PMC failed to 
accommodate her lifting restriction, and that she was 
eventually terminated on account of PMC's perception that 
she was disabled. In support of her perception claim, Deane 
relies on a so-called "laundry list" of PMC's allegedly 
erroneous perceptions. According to Deane, PMC believed 
that she was unable to lift more than ten pounds, push or 
pull anything, assist patients in emergency situations, 
move or assist patients in the activities of daily living, 
perform any patient care job at PMC or any other hospital, 
perform CPR, use the rest of her body to assist patients, 
work with psychiatric patients, or use medical equipment.5 
Deane refutes each of these perceptions -- or, in her view, 
misperceptions -- and contends that her injury was, in 
fact, minor in nature.6 Deane further contends that PMC 
should be held responsible for these misperceptions 
because they were the result of PMC's "snap judgment" 
arrived at without analyzing, investigating or assessing, in 
good faith, the nature of her injury. 
 
Finally, notwithstanding Deane's contention that her 
impairment was minor, Deane has maintained throughout 
the course of this litigation, and continues to maintain on 
appeal, that she requires and is entitled to accommodation 
for her lifting restriction.7 In this regard, Deane contends 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. With the exception of certain alleged misperceptions that are not even 
arguably borne out by the record, such as Deane's inability to open file 
drawers or operate housekeeping equipment, we accept, as we must, 
Deane's description of PMC's misperceptions. 
 
6. Given that Deane vigorously maintained before the district court that 
she was actually disabled and has only now shifted her sole focus to her 
perception claim, Deane's position in this regard is somewhat 
disingenuous. 
 
7. Aside from a few scattered references in her briefs on appeal and at 
oral argument suggesting that she could have performed the lifting 
 




that she could be accommodated either in her previous 
position as a nurse on the medical/surgical floor or 
through reassignment to another position that would not 
require heavy lifting. As to the former, Deane has, from the 
outset, suggested the following accommodations: (1) the use 
of an assistant to help her move or lift patients; (2) the 
implementation of a functional nursing approach, in which 
nurses would perform only certain types of nursing tasks; 
and (3) the use of a Hoyer lift to move or lift patients. With 
respect to the latter, Deane maintains that she could have 
been transferred to another unit within the medical center 
such as the pediatrics, oncology, or nursery units, which 




We have appellate jurisdiction over the district court's 
grant of summary judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
Because our standard of review is plenary, Kelly v. Drexel 
University, 94 F.3d 102, 104 (3d Cir. 1996), we apply the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
required of a nurse on the medical/surgical floor with no 
accommodation, Deane's main argument on appeal is that 
accommodation was wrongly withheld. Indeed, the bulk of her 
submissions to this court focuses on the argument that had PMC 
engaged in interactive communications with her, it would have realized 
that her impairments could have been easily accommodated. Deane 
never informed PMC that she could have performed the required lifting 
without accommodation and the record is entirely bereft of any evidence 
that she could have performed without accommodation at the time of her 
termination. More importantly, Deane argued to the district court that 
she could have been accommodated through job restructuring or 
reassignment and never once contended in her brief in opposition to 
PMC's motion for summary judgment that no accommodation was 
necessary. Accordingly, Deane will not be allowed to transform the 
nature of this case, yet again, by relying on arguments raised for the 
first time on appeal. 
 Deane's alternative argument in this regard is that she can perform 
the essential functions of her previous job without accommodation 
because, according to Deane, lifting is not an essential function of 
nursing. As discussed below, this position is not only factually 
untenable, but is legally irrelevant. 
 




same test the district court should have applied in the first 
instance. Olson v. General Electric Astrospace, 101 F.3d 
947, 951 (3d Cir. 1996); Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 
329 (3d Cir. 1995). We must determine, therefore, whether 
the record, when viewed in the light most favorable to 
Deane, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and that PMC was entitled to summary judgment as a 
matter of law. See, e.g., Olson , 101 F.3d at 951; Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Anderson v. 




Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 in an effort to remove 
societal barriers that historically have prevented disabled 
individuals "from enjoying the same employment 
opportunities that are available to persons without  
disabilities."8 29 C.F.R. App. S 1630, Background. Despite 
Congress's stated purpose of providing "clear, strong, 
consistent, enforceable standards," 42 U.S.C. S 12101(b)(2), 
however, the statutory language does not well serve that 
end. See Note, The Americans With Disabilities Act: Great 
Progress, Greater Potential, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1602, 1615 
(1996) ("One of the Act's major problems is its vagueness. 
Many of the statute's terms are ambiguous, leaving 
employers and disabled individuals uncertain about their 
rights and responsibilities and requiring costly litigation to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The ADA, itself, provides the following statement of purposes: 
 
       (1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the 
       elimination of discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities; 
 
       (2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards 
       addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities; 
 
       (3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in 
       enforcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf of 
       individuals with disabilities; and 
 
       (4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the 
       power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate 
       commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination 
       faced day-to-day by people with disabilities. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 12101(b). 
 




resolve the uncertainties."). As a result, courts have been 
left to determine, with little legislative history to assist 
them, the meaning and application of vague terms and 
concepts through a fact-sensitive, case-by-case inquiry. We 
do not mean to suggest, however, that Congress is 
necessarily to be faulted for its lack of specificity, as the 
capabilities of disabled persons and the manifestations of 
their disabilities are often as diverse and unique as are the 
individuals themselves. Nevertheless, the use of vague and 
general standards rather than strict guidelines -- 
particularly with respect to what constitutes a disability, a 
qualified individual, and reasonable accommodation -- has 
permitted inconsistent if not absurd judgments and favored 
those with easily accommodated disabilities or minor 
impairments, rather than those with serious disabilities 
who seek nothing more than the equal employment 
opportunities to which they are entitled. Id.  
 
The core antidiscrimination section of the ADA provides 
that: 
 
       No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified 
       individual with a disability because of the disability of 
       such individual in regard to job application procedures, 
       the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, 
       employee compensation, job training, and other terms, 
       conditions, and privileges of employment. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 12112 (emphasis supplied). Thus, in order to 
make out a prima facie case under the ADA, a plaintiff 
must be able to establish that he or she (1) has a 
"disability," (2) is a "qualified individual," and (3) has 
suffered an adverse employment action because of a 
disability. See, e.g., Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 101 
F.3d 1090, 1092 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Rizzo v. Children's 
World Learning Centers, Inc., 84 F.3d 758, 763 (5th Cir. 
1996)); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 
1112 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 
F.3d 382, 385 (8th Cir. 1995)). The August 10, 1992 call 
from Ms. Hann terminating Deane because of her 
"handicap" is uncontroverted direct evidence that Deane 
suffered an adverse employment action because of her 
employer's perception of her disability. Deane has, 
therefore, established the third element of her prima facie 




case and that element will not be discussed in further detail.9 
See Martinson v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 104 F.3d 683, 686 (4th 
Cir. 1997) ("When an employer concededly discharges an 
employee because of a disability, the employee need prove 





Mirroring the elements of the prima facie case, the first 
step in deciding any ADA claim is to determine whether the 
plaintiff is disabled under the terms of the Act. The ADA 
defines a "disability" as: 
 
       (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
       limits one or more of the major life activities of such 
       individual; 
 
       (B) a record of such an impairment; or 
 
       (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 12102(2); 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(g). 10 
 
Because, on appeal, Deane concedes that she is not 
actually disabled, but that she was only "regarded as" being 
disabled, we direct our focus to the third tier of the 
statutory definition. Read in conjunction with thefirst tier 
of the definition, defining an actual disability, the third tier 
requires us to determine whether PMC regarded Deane as 
having an impairment and whether the impairment, as 
perceived by PMC, would have substantially limited one or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Likewise, because of this direct evidence, there is no need to analyze 
Deane's claims under the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework. 
See Torre v. Casio, Inc., 42 F.3d 825, 829 n.3 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). 
 
10. Because the ADA does not define many of the pertinent terms, 
phrases, or concepts, we are guided by the Regulations issued by the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") to implement Title 
I of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. S 12116 (requiring the EEOC to implement 
said Regulations); 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2. Regulations such as these are 
entitled to substantial deference. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984); Blum v. 
Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 141 (1982); Helen L., 46 F.3d at 331-32. 
 
                                10 
  
 
more of Deane's major life activities. Deane's actual 
impairment, therefore, is of no consequence to our analysis. 
Parenthetically, it initially may seem odd that Congress 
chose to extend the protections of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act to individuals who have no actual disability. 
The primary motivation for the inclusion of perceptions or, 
more appropriately, misperceptions, of disabilities in the 
statutory definition, however, was that "society's 
accumulated myths and fears about disability and diseases 
are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that 
flow from actual impairment."11 See 29 C.F.R. App. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The limited legislative history makes clear that Congress's primary 
concern in enacting the "regarded as" prong of the ADA was for 
individuals with no limitations but who, because of some non-limiting 
impairment, are prevented from obtaining employment as a result of 
society's myths, fears and prejudices. As the final House Report 
provides, 
 
        The rationale for this third test [the "regarded as" prong] as 
used 
       in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, was articulated by the Supreme 
       Court in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline. The Court noted 
       that although an individual may have an impairment that does not 
       in fact substantially limit a major life activity, the reactions of 
others 
       may prove just as disabling. `Such an impairment might not diminish 
       a person's physical or mental capabilities, but could nevertheless 
       substantially limit that person's ability to work as a result of 
the 
       negative reactions of others to the impairment.' 
 
        The Court concluded that, by including this test, `Congress 
       acknowledged that society's accumulated myths and fears about 
       disability and diseases are as handicapping as are the physical 
       limitations that flow from actual impairment.' 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 485 (III), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1990, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
445 (emphasis added). 
 
The only two examples given in the House Report of individuals 
regarded as disabled are individuals with cosmetic impairments, such as 
burn scars, and individuals who "are rejected from jobs because a back 
x-ray reveals some anomaly, even though the person has no symptoms 
of a back impairment." Id. (emphasis added). Neither of these examples 
involves individuals with limitations. Accordingly, there is no indication 
in the legislative history that Congress gave any thought whatsoever to 
individuals who, like Deane, are not actually disabled but who are 
impaired to the extent that they would require accommodation. 
 




S 1630.2(l) (citing School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 
480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987)). Thus, as one of our sister 
circuits has appropriately recognized, a perception claim 
 
       [a]lthough at first glance peculiar, actually makes a 
       better fit with the elaborate preamble of the Act, in 
       which people who have physical or mental impairments 
       are compared to victims of racial and other invidious 
       discrimination. Many such impairments are not in fact 
       disabling but are believed to be so, and the people 
       having them may be denied employment or otherwise 
       shunned as a consequence. Such people, objectively 
       capable of performing as well as the unimpaired, are 
       analogous to capable workers discriminated against 
       because of their skin color or some other vocationally 
       irrelevant characteristic. 
 
Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't. of Administration, 44 F.3d 
538, 541 (7th Cir. 1995) (emphasis supplied). 
 
The EEOC Regulations provide that an individual is 
"regarded as" being disabled if he or she 
 
       (1) [h]as a physical or mental impairment that does 
       not substantially limit major life activities but is 
       treated by a covered entity as constituting such 
       limitation; 
 
       (2) [h]as a physical or mental impairment that 
       substantially limits major life activities only as a result 
       of the attitude of others toward such impairment; or 
 
       (3) [h]as none of the impairments defined in 
       paragraph (h)(1) or (2) of this section but is treated by 
       a covered entity as having a substantially limiting  
       impairment.12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(h) defines "physical or mental impairment" as: 
 
       (1) [a]ny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic 
       disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the 
       following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special 
sense 
       organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, 
       reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, 
       and endocrine; or 
 
       (2) [a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as mental 
       retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, 
       and specific learning disabilities. 
 




29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(l). See also S. Rep. No. 116, 101st 
Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1989) ("Senate Report"); H.R. Rep. No. 
485 pt. 2, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1990) ("House Labor 
Report"), reprinted in 4 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 
335; H.R. Rep. No. 485 pt. 3, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 29 
(1990) ("House Judiciary Report"), reprinted in 4 U.S. Code 
Cong. & Admin. News 452. Significantly, common to each 
definition is the requirement that the individual not in fact 
have an impairment that, absent the misperceptions of 
others, would substantially limit a major life activity. 
 
Each of the three definitions of being "regarded as" 
disabled, as set forth in the Regulations, applies, as 
written, to a discrete factual setting. The first applies to an 
individual with an impairment that others might consider 
to be a disability but does not technically fall within the 
statutory definition of an actual disability. For example, if 
an employee has high blood pressure, which is controlled 
and is not substantially limiting, and if an employer 
reassigns that employee to a less strenuous job because of 
unsubstantiated fears that the employee will suffer a heart 
attack if he or she continues to perform strenuous work, 
the employee would have been perceived as disabled. 29 
C.F.R. app. S 1630.2(l). The second definition applies to an 
individual who has an impairment that might not ordinarily 
be considered a disability, but is, nonetheless, substantially 
limiting because of the attitudes of others toward it. For 
example, if an employee has a prominent facial scar that is 
not otherwise substantially limiting, and if an employer 
discriminates against that employee because of customers' 
negative reactions to the scar, the employee would have 
been perceived as disabled. Id. Finally, the third definition 
targets a person who has no impairment at all but is 
treated by his or her employer as if he or she is disabled. 
For example, if an employer discharges an employee in 
response to a rumor that the employee was infected with 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV"), even though the 
rumor was completely unfounded, the employee would have 
been perceived as being disabled and, therefore, would be 
disabled for purposes of the ADA. Id. 
 
Deane contends that she satisfies the first definition 
because PMC erroneously perceived the nature and extent 
 




of her impairment. In order to maintain a "regarded as" 
claim under the ADA, however, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate more than the fact that an employer 
misperceived the severity of the impairment. Rather, a 
plaintiff must demonstrate that the impairment, as 
erroneously perceived by his or her employer, would 
"substantially limit" one or more of his or her "major life 
activities."13 See generally Olson, 101 F.3d at 953-55; 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Major life activities include, but are not limited to, "functions such 
as 
caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, 
speaking, breathing, learning, and working," see 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(I), as 
well as "sitting, standing, lifting, [and] reaching." 29 C.F.R. app. 
S 1630.2(I); Senate Report at 22; House Labor Report at 52; House 
Judiciary Report at 28-29. 
 
An individual is defined as "substantially limited" in a major life 
activity other than working if he or she is 
 
       (I) [u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average 
person 
       in the general population can perform; or 
 
       (ii) [s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or 
duration 
       under which an individual can perform a particular major life 
       activity as compared to the condition, manner or duration under 
       which the average person in the general population can perform the 
       same major life activity. 
 
29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(j)(1). In determining whether a person is substantially 
limited in a major life activity, courts should consider 
 
       (I) [t]he nature and severity of the impairment; 
 
       (ii) [t]he duration or expected duration of the impairment; and 
 
       (iii) [t]he permanent or long term impact, or the expected 
permanent 
       or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment. 
 
29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(j)(2). 
 
Where, as here, the major life activity at issue is working, the term 
"substantially limited" is defined as "significantly restricted in the 
ability 
to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various 
classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, 
skills and abilities." Olson, 101 F.3d at 952 (citing 29 C.F.R. 
S 1630.2(j)(3)(I)). Thus, the mere "inability to perform a single, 
particular 
job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life 
activity 
of working." Id. In making these determinations, courts may consider 
 




MacDonald v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 94 F.3d 1437, 1445 (10th 
Cir. 1996); Bridges v. City of Bossier, 94 F.3d 329, 333-34 
(5th Cir. 1996). 
 
After rejecting Deane's claim that she was actually 
disabled, a conclusion that Deane does not challenge here, 
the district court rejected her perceived disability claim on 
three grounds. First, the court found, as a matter of 
undisputed fact, that PMC regarded Deane's impairment as 
limiting her ability to work as a nurse on the 
surgical/medical floor but not her ability to work as a 
nurse in general. Next, the court determined that Deane 
could not have been precluded from working in general in 
her field because, following her termination from PMC, she 
held two positions as a registered nurse. Finally, the court 
concluded, as a matter of law, that PMC's perception of 
Deane's impairment was not motivated by "myth, fear or 
stereotype" and, therefore, was not actionable under the 
ADA. While, as noted earlier, we affirm the district court's 
conclusion that summary judgment should be granted on 
Deane's "regarded as" claim, we do so not on the grounds 
the district court found persuasive, as each of those 
grounds was error. 
 
Taking the three grounds in reverse order, although the 
legislative history to the ADA indicates that Congress was 
concerned about eliminating society's myths, fears, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       (A) [t]he geographical area to which the individual has reasonable 
       access; 
 
       (B) [t]he job from which the individual has been disqualified 
because 
       of an impairment, and the number and types of jobs utilizing 
similar 
       training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical 
area, 
       from which the individual is also disqualified because of the 
       impairment (class of jobs); and/or 
 
       (C) [t]he job from which the individual has been disqualified 
because 
       of an impairment, and the number and types of other jobs not 
       utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within 
that 
       geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified 
       because of the impairment (broad range of jobs in various classes). 
 
29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(j)(3)(ii). 
 




stereotypes and prejudices with respect to the disabled, the 
EEOC's Regulations and interpretive appendix make clear 
that even an innocent misperception based on nothing 
more than a simple mistake of fact as to the severity, or 
even the very existence, of an individual's impairment can 
be sufficient to satisfy the statutory definition of a perceived 
disability. 29 C.F.R. app. S 1630.2(l). Thus, whether or not 
PMC was motivated by myth, fear or prejudice is not 
determinative of Deane's "regarded as" claim. 
 
The second ground -- that Deane's subsequent 
employment in the field of nursing demonstrated that she 
was not substantially limited in the major life activity of 
nursing -- confuses her actual impairment with PMC's 
misperception thereof, confusion caused in no small part by 
Deane having raised, in the alternative, these wholly 
inconsistent claims before the district court. In any event, 
Deane's subsequent work history could, at most, reflect her 
lack of an actual disability. It sheds no light, however, on 
whether, at the time of her termination, PMC regarded her 
impairment as substantially limiting her ability to work. 
 
Finally, in determining whether PMC regarded Deane as 
substantially limited in the major life activity of working, 
the district court overlooked evidence which could have 
precluded summary judgment. Specifically, the court failed 
to consider the affidavit of Deane's vocational expert, Daniel 
Rappucci, who attempted to tie PMC's perception of Deane's 
injury to potential limitations in the workplace, both with 
respect to the "class of jobs" and "broad range of jobs" from 
which Deane would have been excluded.14  We need not, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Some courts have held that summary judgment is appropriate when 
a plaintiff fails to produce vocational evidence with reference to the 
factors delineated in 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(j)(3)(ii), factors tailored 
specifically to the major life activity of working and, instead, relies 
solely 
on the factors set forth in 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(j)(2). See, e.g., Bolton v. 
Scrivner, 36 F.2d 939, 944 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 110 
(1995); Dotson v. Electro-Wire Products, Inc. , 890 F. Supp. 982, 988-89 
(D. Kan. 1995); Marschland v. Norfolk and Western Ry. Co., 876 F. Supp. 
1528, 1539 (N.D. Ind. 1995), aff'd on other grounds, 81 F.3d 714 (7th 
Cir. 1996). Such a bright-line rule appears to be inconsistent with the 
wording of the Regulations, which provides that the factors enumerated 
in 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(j)(2) "should" be considered and that those listed 
in 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(j)(3)(ii) "may" be considered. In any event, Deane 
presented vocational evidence tying PMC's perception of Deane's 
impairment to the factors set forth in 29 C.F.R.S 1630.2(j)(3)(ii). 
 




however, remand for a determination of whether, in light of 
this vocational evidence, summary judgment should be 
granted on Deane's "regarded as" claim because, as is 





The second element of a prima facie case under the ADA 
requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that he or she is a 
"qualified individual." The ADA defines the term "qualified 
individual with a disability" as an individual "who, with or 
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the 
essential functions of the employment position that such 
individual holds or desires." 42 U.S.C. S 12111 (8). The 
interpretive appendix to the EEOC Regulations divides this 
inquiry into two prongs. First, a court must determine 
whether the individual satisfies the requisite skill, 
experience, education and other job-related requirements of 
the employment position that such individual holds or 
desires. 29 C.F.R. app. S 1630.2(m). Second, the court must 
determine whether the individual, with or without 
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential 
functions of the position held or sought.15 Id. See also 
Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 563 
(7th Cir. 1996); Benson, 62 F.3d at 1112. 
 
Determining whether an individual can, with or without 
reasonable accommodation, perform the essential functions 
of the position held or sought, is no easy task and 
conceptually should be separated into two distinct steps. 
First, a court should ask whether the disabled individual 
can perform all the requisite job functions without 
accommodation. If so, the individual obviously is qualified 
and, because he or she can perform all job functions 
without assistance, is not entitled to accommodation from 
his or her employer. If, however, the individual cannot 
perform all the requisite job functions without 
accommodation, the court must determine whether there 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Because PMC does not dispute Deane's general qualifications as a 
registered nurse, there is no need to dwell on the first step of the 
"qualified individual" analysis. 
 




exists any reasonable accommodation to which the 
individual would be entitled that would enable him or her 
to perform the essential functions of the position.16 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. "In general, an accommodation is any change in the work 
environment or in the way things are customarily done that enables an 
individual with a disability to enjoy equal employment opportunities." 29 
C.F.R. app. S 1630.2(o). The text of the ADA provides that "reasonable 
accommodation" may include-- 
 
       (A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible 
       to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and 
 
       (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, 
       reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modifications of 
       equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of 
       examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of 
       qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations 
       for individuals with disabilities. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 12111(9) (emphasis added). 
 
The EEOC Regulations further define "reasonable accommodation" to 
include 
 
       (I) modifications or adjustments to a job application process that 
       enable a qualified applicant with a disability to be considered for 
the 
       position such applicant desires; or 
 
       (ii) modifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to 
the 
       manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired 
       is customarily performed, that enable a qualified individual with a 
       disability to perform the essential functions of that position; or 
 
       (iii) modifications or adjustments that enable a covered entity's 
       employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges 
of 
       employment as are enjoyed by its other similarly situated employees 
       without disabilities. 
 
29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(o)(1). 
 
An individual's right to reasonable accommodation may be subject, 
however, to certain limitations. For example, an employer is not required 
to provide accommodation if it would impose an "undue hardship" on the 
employer as defined in 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(p)(1) and (2). An employer also 
is not required to provide accommodation if the individual poses a "direct 
threat" to the health or safety of himself/herself or others unless such 
accommodation would either eliminate such risk or reduce it to an 
acceptable level. 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(r). 
 




Several of our sister circuits have adopted a similar two 
pronged inquiry modeled on the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act in Arline, 480 U.S. 
at 287 n.17. The Fifth Circuit, for example, has held that 
 
       [f]irst, we must determine whether the individual could 
       perform the essential functions of the job[without 
       accommodation], i.e., functions that bear more than a 
       marginal relationship to the job at issue. Second, if 
       (but only if) we conclude that the individual is not able 
       to perform the essential functions of the job, we must 
       determine whether any reasonable accommodation by 
       the employer would enable him to perform those 
       functions. 
 
Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1393-94 (5th Cir. 
1993) (emphasis added) (interpreting the Rehabilitation 
Act), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1011 (1994). See also Lowe v. 
Angelo's Italian Foods, Inc., 87 F.3d 1170, 1174 (10th Cir. 
1996) (interpreting the ADA); White v. York International 
Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 361-62 (10th Cir. 1995) (interpreting 
the ADA); Gilbert v. Frank, 949 F.2d 637, 640-42 (2d Cir. 
1991) (interpreting the Rehabilitation Act). 
 
While our re-formulation of the inquiry will invariably 
lead to the same results that would be reached under 
Chandler, our phraseology makes explicit what that of the 
Fifth Circuit, if correctly applied, leaves implicit. That is, 
our phraseology embodies the common sense notion that 
any employee, disabled or otherwise, must be able to 
perform all the requisite functions of a given job unless the 
individual is entitled to accommodation by operation of the 
ADA or a similar remedial statute. The problem with the 
Fifth Circuit test is that it is easily misapplied and, as a 
result, could lead to the mistaken impression that a 
disabled individual -- or one perceived to be disabled -- 
who could perform the essential functions of a job without 
accommodation as to those functions, but who could not 
perform one or more marginal or nonessential tasks, should 
be considered qualified without accommodation. That 
conclusion, however, would overlook the fact that job 
restructuring, i.e., excusing the performance of 
nonessential functions or reassigning them to other 
employees, is itself a statutorily defined form of 
 
                                19 
  
 
accommodation. 42 U.S.C. S 12111(9)(B).17 So 
accommodated, then, and only then, would the individual 
be able to perform the essential functions of the position. 
Thus, the formulation we posit today better allows courts 
and parties alike to remain focused on the fact that an 
employee who is excused from performing marginal tasks is 
being accommodated and, in turn, on whether such 
accommodation is statutorily required.18  
 
Applying our two-pronged inquiry to the facts of the case 
before us, it is clear that Deane could not perform all the 
requisite functions of her position. To arrive at this 
conclusion, we, of course, shift our focus from PMC's 
misperceptions back to Deane's actual capabilities and 
limitations. To proceed otherwise would allow an employer's 
misperceptions not only to render an individual disabled, 
but to defeat his or her claim by rendering him or her 
unqualified as well. 
 
The record before us reveals that both PMC and Deane 
acknowledged that lifting patients was a function or 
condition, be it essential or otherwise, of employment as a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. The dissent charges us with improperly importing the consideration 
of nonessential functions into the qualified individual analysis for 
"regarded as" plaintiffs. It is Congress, however, that defined 
"accommodation" to include the restructuring or reassigning of 
nonessential functions. 42 U.S.C. S 12111(9)(B). Thus, when determining 
whether an individual can, with or without accommodation, perform the 
essential functions, see 42 U.S.C. S 12111(8), courts necessarily must 
look to whether the individual may be excused from the nonessential 
functions that he or she cannot perform. Indeed, the lynchpin of the 
ADA is that a disabled individual's qualifications are to be assessed only 
after he or she is accommodated through job restructuring or otherwise. 
Where that accommodation is not available, we do not read the ADA as 
permitting the individual or the court to focus exclusively on the 
essential functions of the relevant position. 
 
18. It is clear that when Congress included job restructuring within the 
definition of reasonable accommodation, it envisioned only the 
restructuring or reallocating of the marginal functions of a given 
position. As the appendix to the regulations indicates, an employer is 
never required to reallocate essential functions, as essential functions 
are, by definition, those that the employee must be able to perform. 29 
C.F.R. app. S 1630.2(o). 
 




registered nurse on the medical/surgical floor. That being 
undisputed, both of Deane's treating physicians were of the 
opinion that, in June of 1992, Deane was "permanently 
disabled from heavy activity," that she could "return to 
work but cannot do unrestricted lifting," and that her 
limitations "should be considered permanent." 19 (See June 
8, 1992 and June 16, 1992 letters of Drs. A. Lee Osterman 
and Carl Sipowicz, respectively.) In addition, Deane testified 
at her deposition that, while lifting patients was necessary 
for complete patient care, her restrictions would have made 
doing so dangerous and would have presented "an awful 
risk" to both her and her patients.20  Thus, when she felt 
ready to return to work, she informed PMC that she had a 
lifting restriction and hoped to be put on light duty 
assignments or be reassigned to another area of the 
hospital. Most importantly, she never argued before the 
district court on summary judgment that she could perform 
the requisite heavy lifting. Rather, she contended that her 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. The fact that these diagnoses might have changed in the years 
following Deane's injury is irrelevant to the issue of Deane's limitations 
and capabilities at the time of the adverse employment action. 
 
20. At Deane's deposition, the following exchange took place: 
 
       Q. Was it ever necessary for a total care patient to put them in a 
       wheelchair? 
 
       A. When I was working there? 
 
       Q. Yes. 
 
       A. Yes. Not for their bath, but -- 
 
       Q. Could you have done that with a lifting restriction? 
 
       A. With a lifting restriction, no. I'd like to rephrase that. I 
suppose 
       anything is possible, if you think about it, we are taking an awful 
       risk. I may or may not have been able to get that patient out of 
the 
       bed and into the wheelchair. I don't think it's a worthwhile risk 
to 
       take when you take a chance that somebody could fall. 
 
       Q. So that would have been dangerous for the patient? 
 
       A. I would think so, yes. 
 
       Q. Probably dangerous for you as well, correct? 
 
       A. Possibly. 
 




lifting restriction easily could have been accommodated 
through either reassignment or job restructuring. Thus, it 
is clear that Deane could not perform all functions of the 
position without some form of accommodation. 
 
Accordingly, we next must determine whether Deane is 
entitled to accommodation and, if so, whether reasonable 
accommodations exist that would enable her to perform the 
essential functions of the position. Deane is at most 
statutorily disabled in that, while her impairment does not 
rise to the level of being a disability, PMC might well have 
perceived her to be disabled. In other words, but for her 
employer's misperception, she would not be afforded the 
protections of the ADA at all. Viewed as such, we do not 
believe that Congress intended that an individual who is 
only perceived to be disabled would be entitled to 
accommodation. 
 
We begin our analysis of Congressional intent on this 
issue with the text of the statute, itself. The core anti- 
discrimination provision of the ADA provides that"[n]o 
covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified 
individual with a disability because of the disability of such 
individual...." 42 U.S.C. S 12112(a) (emphasis added). Thus, 
while far-reaching, the ADA is not boundless and only 
prohibits discrimination engaged in "because of [the 
individual's] disability." Id. In turn, the Act defines the term 
"discriminate" as including an employer's failure to "make[ ] 
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or 
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with 
a disability...." 42 U.S.C. S 12112(b)(5)(A). On its face, 
however, this definition leaves open the question of which 
limitations the employer must accommodate. Specifically, it 
does not indicate whether an employer must accommodate 
any limitation that adversely affects a disabled employee's 
performance or only those limitations caused by his or her 
disability. Reading the two subsections together, we are 
convinced that the ADA requires an employer to 
accommodate only those limitations caused by the 
individual's disability. 
 
This reading is borne out repeatedly in the appendix to 
the Regulations regarding reasonable accommodation. 
There it is stated, in explicit terms, that "[a]n individual 
 




with a disability is `otherwise qualified'... if he or she is 
qualified for a job, except that, because of the disability, he 
or she needs a reasonable accommodation..."; that 
"[e]mployers are obligated to make reasonable 
accommodation only to the physical or mental limitations 
resulting from the disability of a qualified individual..."; and 
that "[w]hen a qualified individual with a disability has 
requested a reasonable accommodation... the employer... 
should... ascertain the precise job-related limitations 
imposed by the individual's disability and how those 
limitations could be overcome with a reasonable 
accommodation. 29 C.F.R. app. S 1630.9 (emphasis added). 
 
Likewise, requiring accommodation only for that which 
actually renders an employee disabled is virtually mandated 
by Congress's intent "to remove barriers which prevent 
qualified individuals with disabilities from enjoying the 
same employment opportunities that are available to 
persons without disabilities." 29 C.F.R. app., Background 
(emphasis added). With the passage of the ADA, Congress 
intended not to erect impenetrable spheres of protection 
around the disabled, but hoped merely "to level the playing 
field" for them. Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights, 65 
F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 1995). Thus, where an individual is 
actually disabled, Congress recognized that reasonable 
accommodations would often be necessary to, in a sense, 
compensate for the individual's disability and allow him or 
her to compete with the non-disabled. See Vande Zande, 44 
F.3d at 541 (recognizing that Congress was "unwilling to 
confine the concept of disability discrimination to cases in 
which the disability is irrelevant to the performance of the 
disabled person's job"). Once accommodated for his or her 
disability, an individual should be on an equal playing field 
with others and thereafter would be on his or her own to 
deal with any non-disabling impairments just as would any 
similarly impaired person without a disability. 
 
In the context of an individual who is not actually 
disabled but is merely "regarded as" such, i.e., one who is 
only statutorily disabled, that which renders him or her 
disabled is not the individual's impairment, if impairment 
there be, but the employer's unfounded stereotypes, fear or 
simple misperception that the impairment is serious 
 




enough to be disabling. To compensate for a statutory 
disability, then, the employer need only be dispossessed of 
its misperception as it is that which renders the employee 
disabled. Thereafter, the individual would be neither 
actually nor statutorily disabled and, like any non-disabled 
individual, would not be able to invoke the accommodation 
provisions of the ADA for any non-disabling impairments -- 
including the impairment that initially might have given 
rise to the employer's perception of a disability. 
Accommodation, therefore, would play no role in leveling 
the playing field.21 Indeed, to hold otherwise would give an 
individual "regarded as" being disabled an undeserved 
windfall were he or she to have a right to be accommodated 
solely by virtue of the employer's misperception where 
others with the same impairment would have no such right.22 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. The evil the "regarded as" provision was intended to combat was the 
effect of "archaic attitudes," erroneous perceptions, and myths. Arline, 
480 U.S. at 279, 285; Wooten, 58 F.3d at 385-86. As more than one 
court has recognized, an ADA perception claim is akin to a racial 
discrimination claim in which an individual is denied employment 
because the employer erroneously perceived that the color of the 
individual's skin somehow made him or her inferior. See, e.g., Vande 
Zande, 44 F.3d at 541. Title VII proscribes such invidious discrimination 
and protects individuals who suffer adverse consequences as a result 
thereof. Such protection, however, does not include any form of 
"accommodation" because it is presumed that the individuals can 
perform their jobs without accommodation. Because the type of 
discrimination faced by those who are perceived to be disabled so closely 
resembles discrimination on the basis of race, with the only significant 
difference being the object of the misperception, we see no reason not to 
treat them in like fashion. 
 
22. It is not by coincidence that this analysis dovetails neatly with the 
EEOC's suggestion that, once a request for accommodation is made, the 
employer and employee should engage in a flexible, interactive exchange 
whereby the employer can become familiar with the precise contours of 
the employee's limitations and can devise appropriate and effective 
accommodations. 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.9. After an employee requests 
accommodation, a meaningful interactive exchange could well rectify any 
misperceptions regarding the employee's impairments. Ideally, once the 
true facts are discovered, the employer could either provide reasonable 
accommodation if it believes the employee to be actually disabled or 
refuse to do so based on its belief that the employee is not, in fact, 
disabled. Of course, if the employer takes the latter course, it will do 
so 
 




We are aware of only one decision of a Court of Appeals 
that has held that accommodation is appropriate in the 
context of a perceived disability claim, and no decision that 
has held that it is not -- until this one. In Katz v. City 
Metal Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1996), the plaintiff, a 
recent heart-attack victim, sought accommodation from his 
employer in the form of a part-time work schedule in 
connection with his "actual" and "perceived" disability 
claims. After the district court granted summary judgment 
in favor of the employer, the First Circuit reversed on the 
basis that there was enough evidence to reach the jury on 
the perception claim. Id. at 32. In doing so, the court held 
that, irrespective of whether the plaintiff was actually 
disabled, he would be entitled to reasonable 
accommodation if the employer perceived him to be 
disabled, reasoning that 
 
       Congress, when it provided for perception to be the 
       basis of disability status, probably had principally in 
       mind the more usual case in which a plaintiff has a 
       long-term medical condition of some kind, and the 
       employer exaggerates its significance by failing to make 
       a reasonable accommodation. But both the language 
       and the policy of the statute seem to us to offer 
       protection as well to one who is not substantially 
       disabled or even disabled at all but is wrongly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
at the risk of an ADA lawsuit being filed against it alleging that the 
employee is actually disabled. The employee would not, by definition, 
however, be able to allege the facts necessary to make out a perception 
claim because the employer's position would be that the employee is not 
disabled. 
 
We agree with Deane that PMC's efforts in this regard were dismal and 
fell far below what has been suggested by the EEOC and required by us. 
See Mengine v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 415, 420-21 (3d Cir. 1997). Had PMC 
engaged in a meaningful interactive process, moreover, it assuredly 
would have realized the minor nature of Deane's limitations. And, of 
course, while Deane would not have been entitled to any form of 
accommodation or protection under the ADA given the minor nature of 
her limitations, PMC may well have decided to retain her in one of a 
number of positions available during the relevant period of time, 
rendering this litigation unnecessary. PMC deserves no medals. 
 




       perceived to be so. And, of course, it may well be that 
       Katz was both actually disabled and perceived to be so. 
 
Id. at 33. 
 
We disagree with both the First Circuit's reasoning and 
its conclusion. Initially, the court's position that an 
individual can be "both actually disabled and perceived to 
be so" is contrary to the unambiguous definition of a 
perceived disability in which an element of each of the three 
categories of perceived disabilities is that the individual not 
have an actual disability. 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(l). Thus, 
because the finding of an actual disability would prevent 
one from satisfying an essential element of a perception 
claim, and vice versa, it necessarily follows that an 
individual simply cannot maintain a perception claim if he 
or she is actually disabled. Accordingly, actual and 
perceived disability claims cannot be presented as 
simultaneous grounds for relief.23 
 
Moreover, the First Circuit mischaracterized the 
underlying intent of Congress in describing the "usual case" 
of a perceived disability as "a long-term medical condition 
of some kind, and the employer exaggerates its significance 
by failing to make a reasonable accommodation." To the 
contrary, it is clear that a person "who is not substantially 
disabled or even disabled at all but is wrongly perceived to 
be so" represents the paradigmatic perception plaintiff 
envisioned by Congress. See 29 C.F.R. app. S 1630.2(l); 
Senate Report at 23-24; House Labor Report at 53; House 
Judiciary Report at 29-31. Further, an employer's failure to 
make a reasonable accommodation, itself, cannot, as the 
court suggested, render the employee disabled, as the issue 
of reasonable accommodation becomes relevant to 
determining whether he or she is qualified only after the 
individual is found to be disabled. 
 
Had the Katz court steered clear of these faulty premises, 
it is by no means certain that it would have assumed, as it 
did, that an individual who is only perceived to be disabled 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. They can, however, be effectively pled in the alternative where, 
unlike 
the case at bar, the plaintiff does not seek accommodation. See Olson, 
101 F.3d at 952-55. 
 




is entitled to accommodation from his or her employer. As 
a result, we do not find the opinion persuasive. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that where an individual claims only 
to have been "regarded as" being disabled, that individual 
is not entitled to accommodation under the ADA. Thus, if 
an individual is perceived to be but is not actually disabled, 
he or she cannot be considered a "qualified individual with 
a disability" unless he or she can, without accommodation, 
perform all the essential as well as the marginal functions 
of the position held or sought.24 
 
Of course, unlike the plaintiff in this case, the vast 
majority of ADA plaintiffs claim to have an actual disability. 
They must show simply that, once accommodated, they can 
perform the essential functions of the position. Individuals 
who are not actually disabled but are merely perceived to 
be so are not entitled to accommodation. Only they must 
demonstrate their ability to perform all the functions of the 
position held or sought. 
 
As a final matter, we must address a few points raised by 
the dissent that, in our view, are misplaced. The dissent 
repeatedly argues that a nondisabled individual with a 
limiting impairment is precisely the individual that the 
"regarded as" claim was designed to protect and that this 
class of individuals will be precluded from bringing suit 
under the ADA. That interpretation of the ADA is entirely 
unsupportable, and the dissent recognizes that it leads to 
a result even it concedes that some would call "untoward." 
Dissent at 41. 
 
As we discussed at footnote 11, supra, none of the 
examples provided by Congress indicates a concern for 
nondisabled individuals who are impaired so as to require 
accommodation. Nevertheless, the dissent claims to find 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
24. Given the state of the law at the time the district court issued its 
opinion, it is understandable that the court framed its analysis in terms 
of whether lifting was an essential function of Deane's position. As this 
opinion should make clear, however, the issue of whether a particular 
task is essential or marginal is irrelevant in a perception case. Once it 
is determined that an individual who is only perceived to be disabled 
cannot perform all the functions of the position held or sought, he or she 
is per se unqualified. 
 




support for its interpretation in two examples provided by 
the Supreme Court in Arline, 480 U.S. at 283 n.9. The first 
is a child with cerebral palsy who was academically 
competitive and was not physically threatening. That child, 
however, had been excluded from public school not because 
he needed accommodation, but because "his physical 
appearance `produced a nauseating effect on his 
classmates.' " Id. (quoting 117 Cong. Rec. 45974 (1971)). 
The second of the Supreme Court's examples cited by the 
dissent is of a woman crippled with arthritis who could 
nevertheless do the job she sought. Like the prior example, 
however, that woman was denied a job not because of her 
limitations or need for accommodation, but because the 
"college trustees [thought] `normal students shouldn't see 
her.' " Id. Ironically, the dissent is correct that these two 
individuals would be archetypal "regarded as" plaintiffs. 
And, under today's holding, both could establish a prima 
facie case under the ADA with ease. Significantly, however, 
and consistent with today's holding, neither of those 
individuals, nor any of those mentioned in the legislative 
history or the regulations, required accommodation to 
perform their jobs. Indeed, the dissent's concern for 
nondisabled individuals who require accommodation, as we 
believe it wrongly assumed the child and the woman did, 
appears to be no one's but the author's. 
 
Finally, we are among those who the dissent recognizes 
will find that its interpretation impermissibly leads to a 
result that is "untoward"; indeed, we suggest that its 
interpretation impermissibly leads to a result that is 
absurd. The dissent concedes that a "regarded as" plaintiff 
can be terminated for not performing nonessential 
functions, but only after establishing at trial that he or she 
can perform the essential functions of the job and 
prevailing in his or her ADA suit. In other words, the 
dissent wishes to recognize a statutory right to 
reinstatement for "regarded as" plaintiffs for whom it, in the 
end, concedes that there is no lasting remedy. If Congress 
did not create a meaningful remedy in a remedial statute 
such as the ADA, however, we simply cannot believe that 
Congress intended to create the right. That said, we are 
wholly unpersuaded by the dissent's position that such 
plaintiffs should retain the ability to "bring" ADA lawsuits, 
 




see Dissent at 41, when the only tangible benefit that can 
possibly be derived therefrom rests on an assumption that, 
after years of expensive litigation, an employer who once 
fired an individual for not being able to perform 
nonessential tasks would have a change of heart and not 
fire that individual again after being told by the court, or its 
counsel, that it is free to do so. 
 
For the same reason, we believe that the dissent's 
invocation of the "mischief" rule is misplaced. Sir Edward 
Coke's "mischief" rule provides, in pertinent part, as 
follows: "The Office of Judges is always to make such 
construction as to suppress the Mischief and advance the 
Remedy." Heydon's Case, 3 Co. 7a, 7b, Magdalon College 
Case, 11 Co. 66b, 73b (quoted in United States v. Second 
Nat'l Bank of N. Miami, 502 F.2d 535, 541 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(Emphasis supplied). Given its own recognition that its 
position fails to guarantee any lasting remedy, the dissent's 
reliance on the "mischief" rule is, at best, strained. More 
importantly, the dissent misconceives the mischief that the 
"regarded as" prong was intended to prevent in the first 
instance. While the elimination of prejudice and 
misconceptions might have motivated Congress to enact the 
ADA, the mischief addressed was the exclusion of qualified 
individuals from the workplace, mischief the dissent, in our 
view, does not adequately address. 
 V. 
 
Once the analysis discussed above is properly 
understood, applying it to the case at hand is a simple 
task. Indeed, Deane's own arguments are enough to defeat 
her claim. On appeal, Deane concedes that she is not 
disabled, but contends that she was perceived to be so by 
PMC. Further, prior to her termination, she requested that 
PMC accommodate her lifting restriction, a request that she 
continues to press here, and the record is utterly devoid of 
any evidence that, absent the requested accommodations, 
she could have performed the lifting required of nurses on 
the medical/surgical floor at the time she suffered the 
adverse employment action. Thus, while not entitled to 
accommodation because she was merely "regarded as" 
being disabled, she effectively concedes that she cannot 
 




perform the functions of her prior position without it. As a 
result, she is not a qualified25 individual with a disability 
and cannot, therefore, maintain a claim under the ADA. 
Accordingly, the order of the district court granting PMC's 
motion for summary judgment will be affirmed. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
25. That is, because Deane concedes that she cannot perform all the 
requisite job functions without accommodation and is not entitled to the 
accommodation that she concedes is necessary to enable her to perform 
the essential functions of the position, she cannot satisfy the qualified 
prong under the test delineated above. 
 




BECKER, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
Judge Barry has written a thoughtful and scholarly 
opinion, but I cannot join it because it has construed the 
prima facie case under the Americans With Disabilities Act 
("ADA") in a way that forecloses a class of so-called 
"regarded as" plaintiffs from bringing a lawsuit, and thereby 
undermines Congressional intent. More specifically, I take 
issue with the majority's holding that a "regarded as" 
plaintiff, in order to be considered qualified under the ADA, 
must show that she is able to perform all of the functions 
of the relevant position without accommodation. It is my 
view that a plaintiff need only show that she is able to 
perform the essential functions of the relevant position 
without accommodation. 
 I base my opinion on the statutory definition of a 
"qualified individual" under the ADA. That definition, in 
clear language, requires an analysis of the essential 
functions only. This reading of the statutory language is 
bolstered by materials published by the agencies charged 
with enforcing the ADA which state, in no uncertain terms, 
that non-essential functions have no place in determining 
whether an individual is qualified. Moreover, consistent 
with Congressional intent, this approach ensures that a 
"regarded as" plaintiff, who has a non-disabling physical 
impairment that prevents her from performing all of the 
functions of the relevant position and that leads an 
employer mistakenly to regard her as disabled, may bring 
an ADA lawsuit if the employer institutes an adverse 
employment decision based on that incorrect assessment of 
her impairment. I would remand this case to the district 
court in order for it to determine whether, as a factual 
matter, the Pocono Medical Center regarded Stacy Deane as 
disabled and whether lifting is an essential function of the 




As the majority correctly points out, the prima facie case 
of an ADA claim includes three elements. First, a plaintiff 
must show that she is disabled. Second, she must show 
that she is qualified for the job she seeks. Finally, she must 
 




show that she suffered some adverse employment action as 
a result of her disability. My concern arises from the 
majority's discussion of the second element of the prima 
facie case -- whether the plaintiff is a qualified individual 




The ADA defines a qualified individual with a disability as 
"an individual with a disability who, with or without 
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential 
functions of the employment position that such individual 
holds or desires." 42 U.S.C. S 12111(8).1 I agree with the 
majority that a determination whether an individual is so 
qualified is a two-step process. First, a court must examine 
whether the plaintiff can perform the job without 
accommodation. If so, then the plaintiff is qualified. If not, 
then, as a second step in the process, a court must 
examine whether the plaintiff can perform the job with a 
reasonable accommodation. If so, the plaintiff is qualified. 
If not, the plaintiff has failed to set out a necessary element 
of the prima facie case. 
 
I part company with the majority, however, when it 
requires that, under the first step in this process, a 
"regarded as" plaintiff must show that she can perform all 
of the functions of the job, essential and non-essential, 
without accommodation. My dissent is concerned only with 
this first step in the analysis of the second element of the 
prima facie case. I will assume arguendo that the majority 
is correct that a "regarded as" plaintiff is not statutorily 
entitled to an accommodation. I note, however, my 
uncertainty about this holding. The issue was not briefed 
by the parties, and I am simply unsure whether there are 
wider, unforeseen ramifications that would render this 
holding unwise. At all events, because of the manner in 
which I would decide Deane's appeal, I do not reach the 
contours of that second step. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Of course, the individual must also satisfy "the requisite skill, 
experience, education and other job-related requirements of the 
employment position." 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(m). There is no dispute here 
that Deane satisfies these requirements. 
 




The majority reaches its conclusion by reasoning that an 
individual who is unable to perform a non-essential 
function of the job without some accommodation is 
rendered unable to perform the essential functions of the 
job without some accommodation because she has been 
accommodated as to a non-essential function. In so 
reasoning, the majority imports an examination of an 
individual's capabilities as to non-essential functions into 
an analysis that, by its statutory terms, is focused solely on 
essential functions. The majority does so without 
discussion as to how those statutory terms admit of any 
ambiguity or how a plain reading of those terms would lead 
to irrational results. 
 
The majority supports its position with a strained reading 
of the statute. The majority argues that because the statute 
includes job restructuring as an accommodation, then an 
individual who requires job restructuring must not be able 
to perform the essential functions of the job without 
accommodation because the job restructuring is itself an 
accommodation, even though the job restructuring has only 
accommodated the individual as to the non-essential 
functions. Given the language of the statute, its purpose, 





The question as to the proper analysis of the first phase 
in the second element of the prima facie case is, at bottom, 
one of statutory interpretation. The "first step in 
interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language 
at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard 
to the particular dispute in the case." Robinson v. Shell Oil 
Co., ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 843, 846 (1997). At least as I 
read it, S 12111(8), which defines "qualified individual," is 
plain and unambiguous. The first sentence of that section, 
quoted in pertinent part in part I.A., makes it clear that the 
phrase "with or without reasonable accommodation" refers 
directly to "essential functions." In fact, there is nothing in 
the sentence, other than "essential functions," to which 
"with or without reasonable accommodation" seems to refer; 
the only terms in the sentence for which an accommodation 
 




would make any sense are "essential functions." In other 
words, there is simply no mention of non-essential 
functions in the statutory definition of "qualified 
individuals" and thus no indication at all that the ADA is 
concerned about whether an individual is capable of 
performing such functions. Therefore, if an individual can 
perform the essential functions of the job without 
accommodation as to those functions, regardless whether 
the individual can perform other functions of the job (with 
or without accommodation), then that individual is qualified 
under the ADA. 
 
Unlike the majority, then, I believe that an individual 
need not show that she can perform all of the functions of 
the job without accommodation to satisfy the first step in 
the second element of the prima facie case. Rather, she 
needs to show only that she can perform the essential 





My reading is consistent with the object and policy of the 
statute. See, e.g., Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 
158 (1990) ("In determining the meaning of the statute, we 
look not only to the particular statutory language, but to 
the design of the statute as a whole and to its object and 
policy."); In re Arizona Appetito's Stores, Inc., 893 F.2d 216, 
219 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[I]f the statutory language gives rise to 
several different interpretations, we must adopt the 
interpretation which `can most fairly be said to be 
imbedded in the statute, in the sense of being most 
harmonious with its scheme and with the general purposes 
that Congress manifested.' " (quoting N.L.R.B. v. Lion Oil 
Co., 352 U.S. 282, 297 (1957))). 
 
Discussing a similar claim in the context of the 
Rehabilitation Act, the Supreme Court wrote that Congress 
intended the "regarded as" claim to combat society's 
"accumulated myths and fears about disability and 
disease." School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 
273, 284 (1987). In order to combat these myths and fears, 
we must be aware of the contexts in which they arise. Only 
 




then can we be sure that we are promoting the 
congressional goals of eliminating the "prejudiced attitudes 
or the ignorance of others." Id. The majority, examining the 
legislative history of and the regulations to the ADA, 
describes a number of factual circumstances in which an 
individual might be subject to these myths and fears.2 They 
include individuals with cosmetic impairments (e.g., facial 
scars) and high blood pressure, and individuals who have 
either been misdiagnosed by a physician (e.g., a misread 
X-ray) or are the subjects of rumors about their 
health (e.g., that the individual is infected with Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV")). In each of these 
circumstances, employers may regard these individuals as 
disabled because of misperceptions about their non-limiting 
physical impairments or their actual, as opposed to 
misdiagnosed or rumored, health. 
 
Missing from this catalogue of cases are those in which 
a visible physical impairment limits the individual in some 
respects but is not actually disabling. But the Supreme 
Court in Arline cited such cases in its discussion of the 
Rehabilitation Act, noting that Congress intended the 
"regarded as" claim in that act to cover, for example, a 
cerebral palsied child who was academically competitive 
and posed no physical threat to others, and a woman 
crippled with arthritis who could nevertheless do the job 
she sought. See id. at 283 n.9.3  Although I have no way of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. As the majority points out, see Maj. Op. at n.11, the legislative 
history 
of the ADA "regarded as" claim cites to, and largely endorses, the 
Supreme Court's discussion in Arline of the purpose of protecting a 
"regarded as" plaintiff. 
 
3. Although left unstated by the Supreme Court, I assume that in these 
examples the individuals suffered from some physical limitations that 
required accommodation from the school, in the case of the child, or 
from her employer, in the case of the woman, as to non-essential 
functions of the school or the job. The majority argues that in neither of 
these examples is an accommodation necessary. That argument, like my 
own statement that each of these individuals indeed needed an 
accommodation, is itself an assumption. Nothing in Arline or the 
congressional statements to which it cites discloses whether these 
individuals required some accommodation. 
 




empirically measuring the size of this class of cases, I 
suspect that the majority of instances in which an 
individual suffers from the prejudiced attitudes or 
ignorance of others occurs when the targeted individual 
exhibits some visible and limiting, though non-disabling, 
impairment, which affects the individual's capability to 
perform non-essential functions but not essential functions.4 
 
In such cases, the effects of myth and fear are evident. 
Those encountering the individual are confronted 
immediately with the impairment and are naturally forced 
to assess its extent. If the impairment were somehow 
limiting, it would be unsurprising, though unfortunate, if 
prejudice or ignorance would lead those encountering the 
individual to misperceive the impairment as disabling. At 
least as I understand the ADA, this is exactly the scenario 
the "regarded as" claim was designed to prevent. 
 
With this purpose in mind, it becomes clear that the 
proper reading of S 12111(8) is that the phrase "with or 
without reasonable accommodation" refers only to 
"essential functions." This reading ensures that the class of 
potential "regarded as" plaintiffs who exhibit some limiting 
but non-disabling physical impairment -- the very plaintiffs 
who would directly suffer from myth and fear -- can bring 
an ADA claim. 
 
If, as the majority would otherwise have it, "without 
reasonable accommodation" does not refer only to"essential 
functions," then such potential plaintiffs would be 
foreclosed from bringing an ADA claim because many of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
That said, I believe that my assumption is more firmly grounded in 
reality. A child with cerebral palsy would likely be excused from gym, for 
example. A woman crippled with arthritis who worked as a clerk would 
likely be excused from lifting heavy file boxes, for another example. At 
all 
events, I seriously doubt that the cerebral palsied child or the woman 
crippled with arthritis would, as the majority claims, be able to show 
that he or she could perform each and every function of the school or 
the job "with ease." And, if he or she failed to make such a showing, the 
"regarded as" claim would, under the majority's formulation, also fail. 
 
4. Concomitantly, I suspect that the kinds of case described by the 
majority are the minority. 
 




them, limited by their physical impairment, cannot perform 
all of the functions -- both essential and non-essential -- 
of the relevant employment position, and because they are 
not entitled to any accommodation. If I am correct that 
many of the "regarded as" plaintiffs will exhibit some 
limiting physical impairment, then the majority has 
significantly restricted the protection provided by the 




My reading of S 12111(8) also comports with the 
interpretation given that provision by the Department of 
Justice ("DOJ") and the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission ("EEOC"), which are both charged with 
enforcing the ADA.5 
 
The EEOC publishes a technical assistance manual for 
employers, other covered entities, and disabled persons to 
learn about their respective responsibilities and rights 
under the ADA. In describing the process to determine 
whether an individual is qualified under the Act, the 
manual states: 
 
       (2) Determine if the individual can perform the 
       essential functions of the job, with or without 
       reasonable accommodation. 
 
       This second step, a key aspect of nondiscrimination 
       under the ADA, has two parts: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The regulations adopted to implement the ADA are of no additional 
help in interpreting S 12111(8). The language in the regulations 
essentially parrots that of the statute. See 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(m) 
(defining a qualified individual, inter alia, as one "who, with or without 
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such 
position"). 
 
Although I cite to materials that have not been adopted pursuant to 
the Administrative Procedures Act, including public notice and comment, 
these materials are generally accorded some deference, though not the 
substantial deference that Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), requires of formally adopted 
regulations, interpretations, and the like. Cf. Koray v. Sizer, 21 F.3d 
558, 
562 (3d Cir. 1994) (according some deference to the internal agency 
guidelines of the Bureau of Prisons that interpret statutory language). 
 




       * Identifying "essential functions of the job"; and 
 
       * Considering whether the person with a disability 
       can perform these functions, unaided or with a 
       "reasonable accommodation." 
 
       The ADA requires an employer to focus on the essential 
       functions of a job to determine whether a person with 
       a disability is qualified. This is an important 
       nondiscrimination requirement. Many people with 
       disabilities who can perform essential job functions are 
       denied employment because they cannot do things that 
       are only marginal to the job. 
 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, A Technical 
Assistance Manual on the Employment Provisions (Title I) of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, II-12 (1992) (emphasis 
in original). I can think of no plainer statement for my 
position than the last paragraph I quote. The EEOC makes 
a clear distinction between essential and non-essential 
functions, and then states that it is only the essential 
functions about which the ADA is concerned. Nothing in 
this provision requires an examination whether an 
individual is or is not capable of performing a non-essential 
function. 
 
Similarly, a pamphlet published jointly by the EEOC and 
the DOJ states that "[r]equiring the ability to perform 
`essential' functions assures that an individual with a 
disability will not be considered unqualified simply because 
of inability to perform marginal or incidental job functions." 
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission & U.S. 
Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, The Americans 
with Disabilities Act, Questions and Answers 2 (1992). 
Finally, a handbook, also published jointly by the EEOC 
and the DOJ states that "[t]he purpose of this second step 
[in determining whether an individual is qualified] is to 
ensure that individuals with disabilities who can perform 
the essential functions of the position held or desired are 
not denied employment opportunities because they are not 
able to perform marginal functions of the position." U.S. 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission & U.S 
Department of Justice, Americans with Disabilities 
Handbook I-37 (1992). 
 




Each of these documents explains S 12111(8) and the 
regulations thereto. All of this material has one common 
theme; the emphasis in the qualified individual analysis is 
on the essential functions of the job only, separate and 
apart from the non-essential functions. This material 
therefore bolsters my view that an individual is qualified 
under the ADA if she can perform the essential functions of 




The difference between my approach and that of the 
majority can be highlighted by an example. Imagine a 
plaintiff who has Tourette's syndrome.6  Assume that this 
plaintiff is not disabled under the ADA, but she does show 
visible signs of the syndrome, which, in her case, includes 
the occasional blurting out of obscenities. Our plaintiff is a 
janitor in a large office building. Assume that she can, 
without any accommodation thereto, perform all of the 
essential functions of her job. Assume, however, that a 
non-essential function of her job is the use, at all times, of 
polite, courteous language when interacting with other 
workers in the office building. Because the nature of her job 
is such that it need not be completed during the day, her 
supervisor, at the plaintiff 's request, has restructured her 
job so that the plaintiff works the night shift. That way, the 
plaintiff will not come into frequent contact with other 
workers in the office building. A new supervisor, 
unfortunately, replaces the earlier supervisor. He learns of 
our janitor's syndrome, regards the syndrome as a 
disability, and fires the janitor because he believes she 
cannot perform the job adequately. 
 
Under the majority's formulation of the prima facie case, 
the janitor cannot bring an ADA claim. Although she 
satisfies the first element (she is regarded as disabled) and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Gilles de la Tourette's syndrome is a "syndrome of facial and vocal 
tics 
with onset in childhood, progressing to generalized jerking movements in 
any part of the body . . . with coprolalia." Dorland's Illustrated Medical 
Dictionary 1635 (27th ed. 1988). Coprolalia is the "compulsive, 
stereotyped use of obscene, `filthy' language, particularly of words 
relating to feces." Id. at 380. 
 




the third element (she was fired because of her disability) of 
the prima facie case, she cannot meet the test for the 
second element. That is so because she cannot perform all 
of the non-essential functions of the job without 
accommodation, thereby failing the first step in the 
analysis, and she is not statutorily entitled to an 
accommodation, thereby failing the second step in the 
analysis. She would be, therefore, unqualified. 
 
As I would fashion the second element of the prima facie 
case for an ADA claim, a plaintiff need only show that she 
is capable of performing the essential functions of the 
relevant employment position without accommodation as to 
those functions. Under my suggested formulation of the 
test, then, our janitor would be qualified for the job because 
she would be able to perform all of the essential functions 
of the job without accommodation thereto. Concededly, our 
janitor, to perform all the functions of her job, must be 
accommodated.7 
 
I submit that our hypothetical janitor is exactly the type 
of plaintiff Congress had in mind when it created the 
"regarded as" claim. If we were to foreclose her ability to 
bring an ADA claim, as the majority would have it, we 




In the present case, then, I believe a remand is in order. 
There is no dispute that Deane cannot engage in heavy 
lifting, a function of the nursing positions she sought at the 
Pocono Medical Center. I believe there is, however, a 
genuine issue of fact as to whether heavy lifting is an 
essential function of those positions. Such a determination 
is material to Deane's claim, at least as I read the ADA; if 
heavy lifting is not an essential function, and if Deane can 
perform the remainder of the essential functions of the 
nursing positions she sought, then she has satisfied the 
second element of the prima facie case. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. However, I make no claim that such accommodation is statutorily 
required. As I note supra part I.A., I reserve comment as to whether a 
"regarded as" plaintiff is entitled to accommodation. 
 




I believe further that Deane has also presented enough 
evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether the Pocono Medical Center regarded her as 




I recognize that my reading of the ADA might lead to a 
superficially bizarre result, which, upon examination, 
disappears but is, at all events, both logical and completely 
consistent with congressional intent. To illustrate this 
result, let us recall our hypothetical janitor. Under my 
reading of the ADA, our janitor would be permitted to bring 
a claim against her employer on the grounds that her 
employer fired her because she was regarded as disabled 
despite the fact that she could perform the essential 
functions of the job without accommodation. Assume that 
she wins her case, receives damages, and is returned to 
this job. At this point, our janitor can no longer bring a 
claim under the ADA, because she would be unable to meet 
the first prong of the prima facie case. As we have seen, she 
is not actually disabled, at least as that term is narrowly 
defined by the ADA, and has no history of a disabling 
impairment. Nor is she regarded as disabled, a statement I 
make with confidence because, having lost the case against 
it, her employer will presumably have been disabused of its 
notion that our janitor is disabled. Her employer can 
therefore immediately turn around and fire her for her 
inability to perform all of the functions of the job. 
 
To some, then, my interpretation impermissibly leads to 
an untoward result. See, e.g., United States v. Schneider, 14 
F.3d 876, 880 (3d Cir. 1994) ("It is the obligation of the 
court to construe a statute to avoid absurd results, if 
alternative interpretations are available and consistent with 
the legislative purpose."). In the end, the employer gets 
exactly what it initially wanted (to rid itself of our janitor), 
but had to fight (and lose) a lawsuit to do it, while our 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. There is no dispute that Deane suffered an adverse employment 
action, the third element of the prima facie case. 
 




janitor suffers the very fate she was suing to avoid (losing 
her job), but does so only after winning her case. 9 
 
This result, however, conforms with the venerable 
"mischief " rule, that canon of construction that "directs a 
court to look to the `mischief and defect' that the statute 
was intended to cure." Elliott Coal Mining Co. v. Director, 
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 17 F.3d 616, 
631 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 
637 (Ex. 1584)).10 Congress intended the "regarded as" 
claim at issue here to cure the "mischief" of prejudice 
against and ignorance about disability and disease, which 
prejudice and ignorance might lead employers to make 
employment decisions based on misperceptions.11 That is 
exactly what our janitor did by bringing her lawsuit; she 
exposed the myths and fears surrounding Tourette's 
syndrome. The mischief having been cured, there is no 
more work for the "regarded as" claim, or the ADA for that 
matter, to do. No longer mistaken about Tourette's 
syndrome, our janitor's employer now treats our janitor the 
same as any other janitor in its employ. The goals of the 
"regarded as" claim have thus been accomplished. As far as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The result does not mean that the janitor has ultimately been denied 
some meaningful, lasting remedy, as the majority claims. As I have 
already noted, she is potentially entitled to damages for the firing. 
 
10. The majority's suggestion that I misuse the mischief rule is 
incorrect. 
The mischief rule is an interpretive technique employed to ensure that a 
statute "will be construed to apply only so far as is needed to remedy the 
perceived mischief." 2B Norman J. Singer, Sutherland on Statutes and 
Statutory Construction, S 54.04 (5th ed. 1992). That is precisely what I 
am endeavoring to do: remedy the prejudice and ignorance that distorts 
employment decisions. 
 
11. The majority's claim that I have misconceived the "mischief " that the 
"regarded as" claim was meant to prevent is unfounded. The elimination 
of prejudice and ignorance is integral to ensuring that otherwise 
qualified individuals are not excluded from the workplace. As I explained 
in part I.C., the majority's formulation of the prima facie case will 
foreclose the ADA claims of many "regarded as" plaintiffs who may have 
been harmed by such prejudice and ignorance. If they are unable to 
bring ADA claims, such plaintiffs will be unable to eliminate that 
prejudice and ignorance, thereby ensuring that otherwise qualified 
individuals may suffer adverse employment decisions because they are 
the subjects of misinformation. 
 




the ADA is concerned, if our janitor's employer makes 
irrational or unfair employment decisions based on factors 
other than a disability, so be it. 
 
But that is far from the end of the analysis. For, I 
suspect that which is untoward is not the putative result of 
my hypothetical but the hypothetical itself in that, under 
the circumstances described, I seriously doubt that the 
janitor would be fired. More likely, the employer would 
probably not fire her but just have her work at night, either 
because the employer is now enlightened or would prefer to 
avoid a possible second lawsuit. In such event the purposes 
of the ADA, unattainable under the majority's approach, 




The ADA presents subtle issues of statutory 
interpretation, far more subtle and difficult I might add, 
than those prescribed under the other anti-discrimination 
statutes (Title VII, ADEA etc.). Compounding the difficulty 
in this case was the unusual nature of Deane's claim. It is 
unsurprising, then, that this case has generated 
disagreement over the meaning of the ADA. With due 
respect for the majority, I believe that my interpretation of 
the relevant statutory language is the correct one. I 
therefore respectfully dissent. 
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